What are Human Rights? by Bouillon, Hardy
 F
ri
ed
ri
ch
-N
au
m
an
n
-S
ti
ft
u
n
g
OccasionalPaper 6
Hardy Bouillon
What are Human Rights?
Imprint:
Published by
The Liberal Institute of the
Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Truman-Haus
Karl-Marx-Str. 2
D–14482 Potsdam
Tel.: +49 (0) 331.70 19 - 2 10
Fax: +49 (0) 331.70 19 - 2 16
Email: libinst@fnst.org
www.libinst.de
Production
COMDOK GmbH
Office Berlin
Reinhardtstr. 16
D–10117 Berlin
Printed by
ESM Satz und Grafik GmbH
Wilhelminenhofstr. 83-85
D–12459 Berlin
Second Edition 2005
 What are Human Rights? 1
What are Human Rights?
Hardy Bouillon
Paper presented at the international colloquium 
“The Fate of Liberty” of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 
Potsdam, 17-19 September 2004
06-OC-innen-total neu.indd   1 27.03.2006   11:05:12 Uhr
2 What are Human Rights?  What are Human Rights? 3
„LIBERALS GENERALLY WISH TO preserve the concept of „rights“ for such 
„human“ rights as freedom of speech, while denying the concept to private 
property. And yet, on the contrary the concept of „rights“ only makes sense 
as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not 
also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity 
and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the 
standard.“
Murray Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty
Introduction
Given the impact of human rights as a topic in political debate, it may come as 
a surprise that the theory of human rights plays no bigger role in the theoretical 
treatises of liberal thinkers.1 Probably, the main reason for this is that human rights 
are usually presented as a logical inconsistent bundle of rights and claim-rights.2 
As Murray Rothbard – whom we owe the introductory quote – continues in his 
Ethics of Liberty: „In the ﬁrst place, there are two senses in which property rights 
are identical with human rights: one, that property can only accrue to humans, so 
that their rights to property are rights that belong to human beings; and two, that 
the person‘s right to his own body, his personal liberty, is a property right in his 
own person as well as a „human right.“ But more importantly for our discussion, 
human rights, when not put in terms of property rights, turn out to be vague and 
contradictory, causing liberals to weaken those rights on behalf of „public policy“ 
or the „public good.““3
The logical inconsistency of human rights „when not put in terms of property 
rights“ derives not only out of the fact that human rights theory has various intel-
lectual roots that are logically incompatible; it also results from the fact that the 
various intellectual sources - e.g. Locke‘s Two Treatises of Government, the French 
1  Note, that Rothbard uses the term „liberal“ to denote the American Democrats and their ad-
herents, while we use „liberal“ in the classical European sense.
2  Frank van Dun addresses this incoherency when writing that „over the past ﬁfty years, the UD 
[Universal Declaration of Human Rights, HB] has generated a hyperinﬂation of rights that can 
only destroy the value of rights altogether.“ (Frank van Dun, „Human Dignity: Reason or Desire? 
Natural Rights versus Human Rights“, in: The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, Fall 
2001, p. 2)
3  Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, chapter 15, http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ﬁfteen.
asp
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the American Bill of Rights - „do 
not concern the rights of man as such, but rather the rights of the citizen, i.e., the 
rights of members of „political associations“ (e.g., states).“4
A third reason seems to root in the Aristotelian tradition of essentialism.  Take 
for instance the title question „What are human rights?“ Willy-nilly, it assumes 
that there could be an answer that would unravel the genuine essence of the 
phenomenon called human right. However, as the German philosopher of science, 
Gerard Radnitzky, pointed out, a question of the type „“What is ... ?“ [or What are 
...?“, HB] is nonsensical if understood as a question for the essence“ of an entity 
or phenomenon. It reveals the justiﬁcationist belief that one could deliver a „true“ 
deﬁnition of what an object or phenomenon „really“ is.“5 He who takes a question 
of the type „What is ...?“ as a question for the true deﬁnition of something, ob-
viously confuses an empirical question with a deﬁnitorial question. 
More plainly, Radnitzky‘s point is that real deﬁnitions do not deliver what they 
pretend to do. They do not deﬁne reality. Reality cannot be deﬁned by language. 
It can be explained with the help of the sciences and the conceptions developed 
in the course of scientiﬁc evolution, namely explications. (And the falsiﬁcationist 
method as developed by Karl Popper is an appropriate way to go on in ones scienti-
ﬁc endeavour.) Hence „What are human rights?“ is not a question to any empirical 
science, despite the fact it might become one in a special context.
„What are human rights?“ asks for what we mean by human rights, how we 
deﬁne them, or with respect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
how the General Assembly of the United Nations and the subscribers to the De-
claration deﬁned human rights.
Bearing this in mind, this paper to a large extend addresses to the deﬁnition 
of human rights as we ﬁnd it in the Universal Declaration and sheds some light on 
the disputable aspects of the deﬁnition of human rights as it is to be found there. 
The two ﬂashlights I shall use are side-products of, ﬁrstly, an analysis of the three 
types of sources of human rights, and, secondly, of an analysis of the two sorts 
of human rights. Once the conclusions of these considerations are drawn, I shall 
discuss the question whether or not political associations and its legal powers can 
safeguard human rights.
Sources of human rights
It is a traditional philosophical and ongoing dispute whether human rights are facts 
or norms or both. Adherents to natural rights theories usually claim that human 
rights are not only given to humans, hence are facts, but also by necessity to be 
obeyed by everybody, and hence normative too.
Although by distinguishing three types of sources of human rights this position 
is to be criticized in this section, I ﬁrst of all want to draw the reader‘s attenti-
on to the fact that the Universal Declaration seems to treat human rights mainly 
normatively, or, more precisely, the universal respect of human rights as a goal. 
As we read it towards the end of the preamble: „THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proc-
laims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual 
and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive 
by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and 
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.“6 
Two things should be mentioned here. Firstly, as in subsequent paragraphs, 
especially in the beginning (§2) and towards the end (§28, §29), the General As-
sembly speaks of rights and freedoms without saying by which criteria we are to 
distinguish between these two.7 Secondly, the General Assembly does not strive for 
universal human rights but limits its ambitions to the peoples of Member States 
and to the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.8
However, if we move on, we notice that the General Assembly also most pro-
bably thought of human rights as facts, quote (§1): „All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.“
Beside the fact that the intertwined conception of human rights as norms and 
facts is confusing, one should acknowledge - with David Hume - that it is logically 
impossible to infer from facts to norms.
4  Frank van Dun, „Human Dignity: Reason or Desire? Natural Rights versus Human Rights“, in: 
The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, Fall 2001, p. 3.
5  See Gerard Radnitzky, „Deﬁnition“, in: Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie, edited by Helmut 
Seiffert and Gerard Radnitzky, Munich: Ehrenwirth 1989, p. 30.
6  Hereinafter all quotations taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights follow the 
online version at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
7  For a profound distinction between freedoms and rights see Anthony de Jasay, Choice, Contract, 
Consent: A Restatement of Liberalism, London: IEA 1991, chapters 2&3.
8  See footnote 4.
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This in turn leads us to a more general question, namely where human rights 
can originate, and thus to the three sources of rights. These sources can be deﬁned 
through a process that exempliﬁes a generating dichotomy: If we look at the pos-
sible creators of such phenomena like rights, we may either turn to nature (divine 
or non-divine, as you like it) or to humans. And as per humans, we may draw a 
distinction between rights that come by intention and those that don‘t. Or, to put 
it in a frame we owe to Friedrich August von Hayek, who applied it to sources of 
order9, we either have natural rights, spontaneous rights or designed rights.
If I am not mistaken, these three sources of human and other rights cover all 
the various proposals made in the course of history of the philosophy of rights. 
Authors of different schools either claimed rights to result from nature (divine or 
non-divine), as we know it from the long tradition of natural rights theory, or clai-
med rights to originate in the spontaneous results of human interactions - think 
of conventions - or, ﬁnally, assumed that rights were designed and deﬁned by hu-
mans. Of course, some schools or individual authors developed rights approaches 
that adapted elements out of two or out of all three types of sources. What is of 
interest here is if, and if so, how these three sources of rights differ with respect 
to the binding force they can and do claim. In other words: Do they, and if so, how 
do they differ when it comes to legitimacy and its proof. 
Interestingly, natural rights theorists as well as those scholars, who claim rights 
to come by conventions that evolved spontaneously and over time, have one thing 
in common: The claim they make for distinct rights rests on assumptions whose test 
criterion is far from being non-problematic or even low-problematic. For example, 
referring to the Ten Commandments, a Jewish or Christian author might claim that 
human rights exist as described in the Old Testament. Hence his claim can rest on 
the assumption that the Ten Commandments are a valid source of rights and that 
his reading of that source is the correct one. Obviously, the test criterion is highly 
problematic, for there exists no non-problematic (or low-problematic) document 
upon which the claim can rest. The origins of the bible are as highly disputable as 
are its interpretations. Also, a defender of conventional rights might refer to certain 
traditions and his reading of these traditions. But what is the criterion by which 
we easily can test his claim? He has no non-problematic (or low-problematic) do-
cument (or any other unproblematic means that could serve in the test process) 
upon which the proof can rest.
Things change dramatically when it comes to designed rights. Take rights that 
originate in contracts. The test criterion to prove that these rights exist as the result 
of an agreement does not face the problems described above. The identiﬁcation 
is non- or low-problematic, for there exists a document towards we can refer for 
the purpose of identiﬁcation, namely the contract.
What can be said in addition to the distinction between natural rights and 
conventionalist approaches on one side and contract approaches on the other is 
that the latter per se can offer a document, namely the contract, that can easily 
be used to identify the voluntary consent of the agreeing parties. The two other 
approaches have nothing of this kind to offer. The consent of the parties involved 
is at best claimed.
Of course, we face an entirely different situation when the contract is not do-
cumented, i.e. when it is purely ﬁctitious. One might think of Rousseau‘s contrat 
social or of modern social contract theorist.10 Fictitious contracts are like natu-
ral rights and conventionalist rights approaches in two respects. Their underlying 
claim for distinct rights rests on assumptions whose testability is largely dubious, 
and they provide no proof of the voluntary agreement of the parties involved that 
could easily be identiﬁed.
The Universal Declaration includes the problematic types of sources of rights as 
well as the non- or low-problematic ones. In some parts the Universal Declaration 
reminds us of the old idea of a societal contract without human‘s consent, notwith-
standing a proof of their consent, for instance when it claims in §1, I quote again: 
„All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.“ This reminds us 
of Rousseau‘s famous opening passage: „MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in 
chains.“11 Of course, the Universal Declaration is also a document, and it may well 
be argued that at least those who signed it declared it is binding to them. Hence, 
the assumption that human rights exist - in the sense that the rights create ob-
ligations to the subscribers of the Universal Declaration - can easily be tested by 
referring to this document. However, problems come up as soon as it is claimed 
that the Universal Declaration is also binding to anybody else.
To sum up: The Universal Declaration is principally laden with speciﬁc pro-
blems when interpreted as a version of those approaches that claim human rights 
9  See F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
10  For example, John Rawls. See also the chapter on safeguards of human rights in this booklet.
11  The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right by Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1762, translated 
by G. D. H. Cole, public domain, Book I.1
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to exist. These problems do not appear if the Declaration is seen as a document 
expressing consent of the signing parties on the acceptance of certain rights as 
described in the Universal Declaration. Hence, it would be advisable to those who 
wish to propagate the Universal Declaration successfully to have many individu-
als as possible signing it. But doing so, one should take note of the problem of 
inconsistency within that Declaration, as mentioned above and illustrated in the 
subsequent section.
Sorts of human rights
Most of the rights expressed in the Declaration are formulated as defensive rights 
against various forms of aggression or intervention by others. Such we may inter-
pret several of the paragraphs, for instance: „Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person.“ (§3), „No one shall be held in slavery or servitude;“ (§4), 
„No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.“ (§5), „No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile.“ (§9), „No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence,“ (§12), „Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.“ (17), „Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion,“ (§18), „Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,“ 
(§19), or: „Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and associa-
tion,“ (§20) 
All of these rights are exempliﬁcations, or say, can be interpreted as exempli-
ﬁcations of private property rights and the right to individual freedom understood 
as the absence of coercion.
However, other rights stated in the Declaration are offensive claim-rights in the 
sense that they constitute a claim against other people - which are not speciﬁed, 
by the way - and thus exemplify titles to intervene into the individual freedom of 
others. In other words, the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration are 
inconsistent. The following quote might serve as an example:
„(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and fa-
vourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring 
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemen-
ted, if necessary, by other means of social protection.“ 
While „The right to work, to free choice of employment“ is an expression of 
individual freedom that does not include aggression or interference with the indi-
vidual freedom of others, the following rights logically include such interventions, 
for if one is entitled to ﬁnd „just and favourable conditions of work and protection 
against unemployment“, someone has to provide these conditions and measures of 
protection. And given he does not voluntarily do so, he has to be coerced to meet 
that claim of his contemporary.
Similarly, if one „has the right to equal pay for equal work“, someone else is 
obliged to pay to him what he pays to his other employees for equal work. Also, if, 
„[e]veryone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring 
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemen-
ted, if necessary, by other means of social protection“, someone has to provide all 
this.  
Finally: „Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.“ (§25) and, „Everyone has the right to edu-
cation. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. 
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education 
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible 
to all on the basis of merit.“ (§26).
Again, someone has to provide the means for the standards of living, the means 
for free education and the institutes of higher education. All this is not manageable 
without interference with the private property of other people. Moreover, the ﬁnal 
quote also reveals that human rights in the Declaration are limited to adults, for it 
is recommended that elementary education shall be mandatory.
Summarizing what we have noted about the two kinds of rights among the 
human rights in the Universal Declaration, we can conclude the following: Liberal 
human rights and illiberal claim-rights do not match together. Moreover, the claim-
rights among the human rights of the Universal Declaration are also difﬁcult to 
interpret; for which living conditions meet human dignity and which do not? And 
which size of social protection is necessary to be supplementary, given that too 
much can lead to an insufﬁcient use of human powers as for Wilhelm von Hum-
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boldt has warned us?12 There is no criterion that could claim to be unproblematic 
and unanimously consensual. Views on the living conditions and the supplementary 
provision probably differ widely. Who is going to decide? On which basis?
For Humboldt there was no higher end than man himself, no highest purpose of 
nature, and to him all limits to human action were solely for the sake of individual 
liberty, only for the sake of the true end of man. In his ideas On the Limit of State 
Action he put it very clearly: „The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by 
the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and 
transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers 
to a complete and consistent whole. Freedom is the ﬁrst and indispensable condi-
tion which the possibility of such a development proposes.“13
Hence the state (or civil society) exists only because it serves man and his hu-
man rights. Civil society is to Humboldt not an end in itself, left alone the highest 
purpose of nature. There are several statements in Humboldt‘s On the Limits of 
State Action that can be fully understood only if this anthropological element is 
entirely taken into account. For instance, on laws and state institutions he wrote: 
„A State, in which the citizens were compelled or moved by such means to obey 
even the best of laws, might be tranquil, peaceable, prosperous State; but it would 
always seem to me a multitude of well-created-for slaves, rather than a nation of 
free and independent men ... none of these [laws, HB] lead to true moral perfec-
tion ... If it were possible to make an accurate calculation of the evils which police 
regulations occasion, and of those which they prevent, the number of the former 
would, in all cases, exceed that of the latter.“14
Thus, to Humboldt the true end of man makes freedom indispensable and re-
quires universal respect of human rights. Since man alone knows his powers, and 
since he alone knows how to develop them, the state cannot and may not overtake 
the task of leading man to his completion. Humboldt argues anthropologically and 
morally in favour of human rights, understood as property rights. But this fact is 
not the only reason for us to quote him here. The second reason is that Humboldt 
brings in the argument that the whole purpose of the state is to provide the condi-
tions under which individual freedom and human rights are preserved. The question 
to which we turn now is whether or not the state and its powers are qualiﬁed to 
serve as a safeguard to human rights.
Safeguards of Human Rights
It is a standard approach in modern political theory to expect from democracy the 
best of all possible solutions to political problems whatsoever.15 However this may 
be in general, when it comes to the preservation of human rights, the very nature 
of democracy is far from providing a feasible solution. On the contrary! Since a 
democratic society has the constitutional means to reduce the private sphere and 
human rights by enlarging the public sector proportionally, there is little hope to 
ﬁnd ways that could lead to a protection of individual liberties and human rights 
without questioning the principles of a democratic constitution.
The renaissance of classical liberalism has shown such ways. Among the most 
serious and interesting approaches are the ones of Friedrich August von Hayek 
and James M. Buchanan. Hayek offers a deﬁnite framework of a state in which a 
constitutional protection of individual liberty and human rights should be ensured. 
Buchanan‘s way is a different one: He assumes the possibility that rational indi-
viduals would agree unanimously to decision rules that were to be followed when 
searching for the rules of a constitution. All individuals are assumed to agree to 
these decision rules, since each recognizes the advantage of having such rules, and 
nobody could be certain of possible advantages or disadvantages of any of the de-
cision rules (veil of uncertainty). The next step from these unanimous decision rules 
should lead to the rules of a constitution of liberty. Before analyzing Buchanan‘s 
suggestion, let us turn to the Hayekian model constitution.
12  Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action, ed. By J.W. Burrows, Cambridge: University 
Press 1969, Chapter 3.
13  Wilhelm von Humboldt, op. cit., p. 22. To get a taste for Humboldt‘s prose and spelling, I quote 
from the original: „Der wahre Zwek des Menschen - nicht der, welchen die wechselnde Neigung 
ihm vorschreibt - ist die höchste und proportionirlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganzen. 
Zu dieser Bildung ist Freiheit die erste, und unerlassliche Bedingung“ (Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 
I, Berlin 1903, p. 106).
14  The latter part of the quotation from Humboldt (1969, pp. 79-81) has to be interpreted carefully. 
Humboldt is not saying that laws and police regulations produce criminals. Not at all. It is that 
those occasion moral evils, although physical evils might be reduced by them. These moral evils, 
i.e., stiﬂed energy, are, according to Humboldt, by far more fatal to man than physical evils.
15  Only recently, the implicit and explicit assumption of the primacy of the democratic model was 
seriously questioned by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy. The God that failed, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books 2001.
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Hayek‘s model constitution
Hayek suggests to split up the parliament into two separate, independent assem-
blies: one (the governmental assembly) has to look after the interests of the ci-
tizens (who elected the parliament), the other (legislative assembly) has to make 
laws.16 The separation of „interest“ (the concrete wishes of the citizens for parti-
cular results) from „opinion“ (views about what kind of action is right or wrong) 
is, according to Hayek, necessary to avoid the possibility that the interest of the 
majority gets the status of a law. To Hayek, laws are to codify just conduct, rather 
to push through the interests of particular groups. Thus - on ﬁrst side - one could 
assume that his proposal could help to safeguard human rights against the inte-
rests of the majority.
But looking closer at Hayek‘s proposal one might ask: On what conditions does 
the legislative assembly convert rules of just conduct only, and not particular in-
terests into laws? Hayek addresses his model constitution to that question. Firstly, 
those who are to be elected - out of a group of people who themselves have to 
be elected by contemporaries to whom they are known fairly well, since they are 
of the same age and at least remotely acquainted with each other - should be in 
the middle of their lives, and their membership should last 15 years. They should 
be respected people, because of their performances in profession and public life. 
They should be honest, and their salary should „be ﬁxed by the Constitution at a 
certain percentage of the average of, say, the twenty most highly paid posts in the 
gift of government.“17 The salary should guarantee the legislator a carefree future 
after the tenure and should make him/her resistant to bribery.
There is little doubt that a legislative assembly of that sort could think of such 
general rules, e.g. ‚Private property should be respected‘, ‚Nobody should be ag-
gressed by another‘, and brand them human rights. These rules would fulﬁll the 
criterion of applying to any person of the community chosen at random, and not 
solely to a particular group and thus they would allow us to separate aggressive 
claim-rights from liberal human rights - simply by pointing to the fact that the 
former contradict these rules.
However, Hayek‘s suggestion is problematic; not so much because of some 
technical questions. An election of such a legislative assembly could certainly be 
arranged, although with several technical problems.18 The main problem of Hayek‘s 
model constitution results from the interest structure of men: Certainly, a commu-
nity of honest and in most respects noble men and women who would care about 
human rights could be found, but it is less probable that they became elected. The 
electors have no interest in preferring an honest legislator to a less honest one, 
since the latter would publicly argue that he will suggest „rules of just conduct“ 
which only appear to be „true“ rules of just conduct - left alone what „true“ rules 
of just conduct in practice should look like -; however, these rules would actually 
be in the personal interest of the legislator‘s voting clientele.19 
However, there exist many alleged general rules that are factually and formal-
ly addressed to a particular group, for instance the right to vote: It is democratic 
standard that only adults should be allowed to vote. (Whether or not there might 
be good arguments to exclude the immature from the right to vote is a question 
which is not signiﬁcant for our purpose.) Once a non-universal rule - as the right 
to vote - is accepted to be a general rule, a new element joins the game. Now we 
have a precedent which allows restriction of the application of the very rule. Now 
it is accepted that we might discuss narrowing or widening the group of people to 
which the rule is to be addressed. Each change of the rule is assumed to be - and 
in most cases will be - advantageous or disadvantageous at least to one particular 
subgroup of the community, despite the formal character of the rule. (Or else there 
would be no change. In the extreme case, the change could be advantageous or 
disadvantageous - though perhaps not intended - to the whole community.)
Suppose, the human right to vote is given only to those who are 18 years old or 
older. Now assume that this rule should be altered: The right to vote will be given 
to people between 16 and 90. This would clearly improve the situation of those 
who are 16 and 17, whereas the situation of members of the community over 90 
would be worse than under the status quo. Given the alteration of the rule would 
aim at a rise of the voting age, say 21 and higher, then the situation of those who 
are 18, 19, or 20 would be worse than under the status quo.
Many of the very important general rules have clauses qualifying the group of 
16  Hayek, F. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free People. London: 
Routledge & Keagan, p. 111ff.
17  Ibid., p. 114.
18  See Volker Nienhaus, Persönliche Freiheit und moderne Demokratie, Tübingen: Mohr 1982.
19  Hayek is aware that elected legislators could - in principle - become unfaithful to their noble 
cast of mind. To avoid this, he suggests a council of elders who would have to control the 
legislators. However, the problem caused by the interest structure of men is not solved, though 
less acute. It is moved to a higher level. The question ‚Who guards the guards?‘ still has to be 
answered.
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persons to which they are addressed. To these belong property rights, since only 
matures may make proper use of them.
For another reason, the purely formal character of a general rule is not sufﬁ-
cient, since the application of such a rule takes place all the time in certain his-
torical situations. The assertion of the rule depends on the extent of sanctions 
for rule-deviating. For example, whether the rule ‚pacta sunt servanda (contracts 
are to be fulﬁlled)‘ is practiced, depends, though not only, on the sanctions for 
rule-breakers. It depends on how they will be punished by law, given they will be 
accused. But each regulation of the extent of punishment is in the interest of a 
particular group: Assumed the extent of punishment is large, it is in the interest 
of the plaintiff. If it is small, then it is in the interest of the accused. And each 
change of the status quo in either direction is of advantage for either one or the 
other group (plaintiff or accused).
Despite their gravity, these problems of Hayek‘s model constitution are not the 
gravest. The crucial weakness of his model is that the laws, which should be given 
by the legislative assembly, are not necessarily those that guarantee individual liber-
ties and hence human rights. We cannot know whether that assembly will choose 
those „rules of just conduct“ which safeguard human rights or not. The legislative 
assembly is simply not a warrant for a constitution of liberal human rights.
Buchanan‘s model of consensus
It goes without saying that if one proposal fails to be a safeguard of liberal human 
rights it does not follow that no other proposal could be conceived that would 
succeed in being one. It is exactly this point that is made by James Buchanan and 
Geoffrey Brennan, who wrote: „Unanimous agreement on some proposed change 
in the rules must be at least conceptually possible.“20 This statement cannot be 
falsiﬁed. It can only be veriﬁed, because it is an existence-statement. For such 
statements - as Rudolf Carnap‘s famous example „There is a colour whose recog-
nition causes horror“ - it holds that it is not logically impossible to prove them.21 
However, looking closer at Buchanan‘s model of consensus, one has to concede 
that it does not verify the statement made by Buchanan and Brennan.22 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Buchanan‘s idea of a social contract is in 
one respect preferable to all other proposals in the classical liberal tradition: It is 
not necessary to include external normative criteria (for example: natural rights, 
efﬁciency, or whatever). The social contract is conceived as a contract to which all 
members agree freely - like all freely agreed contracts.
According to Buchanan, this agreement is possible and probable if the con-
tract is about rules that have advantages, i.e., to have rules, for all members and 
no special advantages or disadvantages for any particular group of members. Man 
can, according to this idea, recognize, or at least assume, the common advantage 
of these rules, and he can make the assumption that - to the very moment - the 
agreed rules do not offer a separate plus or a minus to any member of the group.
To ﬁnd a constitution that is not only to the beneﬁt of a particular group, we 
should look for meta-rules, i.e. decision rules. These decision rules should have 
the above described character: they should be impartial to any person chosen at 
random. The impartial character of the decision rules is of special importance: all 
further rules will - as a consequence - be legitimated by the impartial decision ru-
les. Constitutional rules as well as all other rules of a community can be decided 
on by obeying the meta-rules.
However, as Anthony de Jasay has shown, each decision rule and each consti-
tution has a bias.23 In nuce, it is impossible to ﬁnd impartial rules, no matter on 
which meta-level they should exist, since man always ties some expectations on 
rules; he always assumes that whatever rule he has to agree upon, it will beneﬁt 
especially him. Buchanan‘s approach is based on an epistemological misconcep-
tion: On the one hand it presupposes that contract partners could come to an 
equilibrium of expectations24 and could - as rational, calculating human beings 
20  Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules, chapter 9, http://www.econlib.
org/library/Buchanan/buchCv10Contents.html
21  On veriﬁability and falsiﬁability see Karl Popper; „Falsiﬁzierbarkeit, zwei Bedeutungen von“, in: 
Helmut Seiffert und Gerard Radnitzky, Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie, Munich: Ehrenwirth 
1989, p. 83
22  An elaborate examination of the path James Buchanan suggests to end up with a constitution of 
liberty cannot be delivered here. On this see Anthony de Jasay, „Is limited government possible?“, 
in: Gerard Radnitzky and Hardy Bouillon (eds.), Government: Servant or Master?, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi 1993, pp. 73-97, especially paragraph 7. There, Jasay put forward arguments that con-
vincingly make it clear that Buchanan‘s constitutional approach does not - necessarily - lead 
to a constitution of liberty. 
23  Ibid., paragraphs 6, 9 and 10. 
24  James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, Chicago, p. 89
06-OC-innen-total neu.indd   14-15 27.03.2006   11:05:13 Uhr
16 What are Human Rights?  What are Human Rights? 17
- decide for meta-rules on recognizable collective advantages. On the other hand 
it claims that the same individuals will not have any guesses and cannot build any 
expectation about contingent individual advantages which might generate out of 
„impartial“ meta-rules, and, consequently, that they cannot rest their decision for 
such meta-rules on possible individual advantages.
However, with respect to the aim of ﬁnding a constitution of liberty, this is 
not the main problem of Buchanan‘s approach. The main problem of his consensus 
conception is the same problem that we ﬁnd in Hayek‘s model constitution: It does 
not guarantee a constitution of liberty. All other constitutions can possibly result 
from generating a constitution from alleged impartial rules. This „contract-theo-
retical nihilism“25 cannot be the right means to a constitution of liberty.
Since both, Hayek and Buchanan, offer incomplete schemes for a constitution 
of liberty, their undertakings cannot be regarded as successful. Both intend to de-
fend individual freedom, both provide good arguments for a liberal constitution. 
In other words, they argue for a liberal constitutionalism. These arguments make 
plausible only why a constitution can be useful, but not why that constitution 
would be no other than a constitution of liberty. In other words, they do not pro-
vide a foundation for a constitutional liberalism.
Whether or not other constitutional proposals provide a safeguard to liberal 
human rights cannot be said here.26 However, a strong argument that questions 
the potential of constitutional solutions as safeguards of liberal human rights in 
general is that constitutions create artiﬁcial monopolies to those who represent 
the exclusive powers of a state. Once they have this power, though only tempora-
rily, they face incentives to misuse it, i.e. in their own interest, disregarding the 
original intention. It is irrational to assume that political actors (who are human 
beings after all) should in any case withstand those temptations. 
Safeguarding Human Rights
This paper ends with a short application of the aforesaid to the EU with respect to 
the fact that in most countries the demanded standard of human rights as we ﬁnd 
it in the Universal Declaration is far more distant from completion than it is in EU 
Member States. In comparison to many other countries, it holds for the EU that 
many human rights are protected, the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
Though the cases might be serious ones: Only from time to time it is reported that 
someone was subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, or subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, or subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, and we 
know little cases of slavery and servitude. Most people enjoy the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association, or the right to freedom of thought, consci-
ence and religion, or the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others, and only little is reported of inequality before the law.
To members of countries in which torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile 
and arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence are 
the order of the day, complaints about violations of human rights in EU countries 
might deserve comparatively little compassion. Indeed, a drowning man will have 
little understanding for someone who laments that his feet become wet. 
However, one should not forget that, although the standard of human rights 
and the cases of violations of human rights might differ from country to country, 
the mutual help that we can build up in order to make human rights come true 
everywhere rests on the resistance to all kinds of violations.
In other words, in order to promote the standard to human rights across the 
world, it is necessary, but not sufﬁcient to object to violations against human rights 
that are exempliﬁcations of individual freedom, such as the right to life, liberty, 
and property, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom 
of opinion and expression, and to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; 
also the right to live free of slavery and servitude, free of torture, arbitrary arrest, 
arbitrary interference with ones private sphere. It is also necessary to object to 
entitlements or offensive „claim-rights“ that willy-nilly are violations of individual 
freedom and hence violations of a genuine human right.
However, in the name of human rights, governments in the EU continue to 
promote the welfare state and lift barriers to individual freedom only by creating 
new ones. Thus they contribute to the ongoing erosion of the liberal society that, 
if we look back to history, proved to be the most powerful tool to promote human 
25  See Reinhard Zintl, Individualistische Theorien und die Ordnung der Gesellschaft. Untersuchun-
gen zur politischen Theorie von James M. Buchanan und Friedrich A. v. Hayek, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot 1983, p. 90, and Volker Nienhaus, op. cit., p. 47.
26  It is not logically impossible to prove that one constitutional arrangement can function as 
safeguard of human rights (see footnote 21).
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rights everywhere were the free market and its ideals became respected. It would 
be short-sighted to put this tool at risk. Against this background, I shall end with 
a modest proposal.
EU countries should do much more for the respect of human rights. They should 
give up all trade barriers. Trade barriers violate human rights within and outside 
the EU in so many ways that one should question why human rights group do not 
tackle this issue as they tackle other human rights issues.
In September 2003, shortly before the WTO Meeting in Cancun, CNE, a Brussels 
based think tank, launched a study called EU Trade Barriers Kill.27 This study showed 
that as a result of EU trade barriers, by estimate 6,600 people worldwide die every 
day. If the EU were to lift the barriers, and Africa as a result were to increase its 
share in world trade by a mere one percent, its annual income would increase by 
more than 70 billion - enough to lead 128 million people out of extreme poverty.
Without cynical intention, one is inclined to say that the EU - and of course 
every other political body who erects trade barriers - does not need to infringe 
on such human rights, as the right to life, in order to help people die. To the same 
effect, it is sufﬁcient to interfere with ones right to exchange with other people. 
And often it is even the more efﬁcient way to help people die. All the more should 
we make clear how scandalous these violations of human rights are.
Summary
Human rights are usually presented as a logical inconsistent bundle of rights and 
claim-rights. This inconsistency is one of the reasons why human rights theory 
plays a lesser role than its political impact would make us expect. Nonetheless, this 
logical inconsistency can be resolved if human rights are put in terms of property 
rights. Doing so, human rights approaches could become much more respectable 
positions in political philosophy and beyond.
In this paper, we had a closer look at all possible sources of the origin of (pro-
perty-based human) rights, namely nature, convention, and contract. That helped us 
to realize that only rights deriving out of contracts appear to be low-problematic, 
whereas natural rights approaches as well as rights approaches based on the idea 
of spontaneous convention seem to be inappropriate to support the preservation 
of liberal human rights. 
Against this background, we had a closer look at the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. With the help of the distinction between claim-rights and human 
rights we identiﬁed two incompatible sorts or classes of rights in the Universal 
Declaration. And we concluded that this inconsistency cannot be resolved unless 
claim-rights are excluded. 
Finally, we looked at the potential of two constitutional approaches as safegu-
ards of human rights and the potential of democratic polities in general to safeguard 
human rights. Moreover, we illustrated – with respect to the EU – that violations 
against economic human rights are capable of eroding human rights in general.
27  Stephen Pollard, Alberto Mingardi, Sean Gabb, EU Trade Barriers kill,  http://www.cne.org/
pub_pdf/2003_09_04_EU_barriers_kill.pdf
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